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Abstract
In a standard model of menu choice, we examine the behavior of an
agent who applies the following Cautious Deferral rule: “Whenever in
doubt, don’t commit; just leave options open.” Our primitive is a com-
plete preference relation < that represents the agent’s choice behavior.
The agent’s indecisiveness is captured by means of a possibly incom-
plete (but otherwise rational) preference relation <ˆ. We ask when <
can be viewed as a Cautious Deferral completion of some incomplete <ˆ.
Under the independence and continuity assumptions commonly used
in the menu choice literature, we find that even the smallest amount
of indecisiveness is enough to force <, through the above deferral rule,
to exhibit preference for flexibility on its entire domain. Thus we high-
light a fundamental tension between non-monotonic preferences, such
as preferences for self-control, and tendency to defer choice due to in-
decisiveness.
Keywords: Incomplete preferences, preference for flexibility, choice de-
ferral.
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Indecision is the key to flexibility. Proverb
1 Introduction
The primitive of the theory of choice among opportunity sets is a preference
relation defined on a collection X of subsets of a given space of alternatives.
These subsets are interpreted as “menus” from which an alternative will be
selected at some later (unmodeled) stage. With this dynamic interpretation
in mind, Kreps [21] introduced a monotonicity property called “preference
for flexibility,” which states that a decision maker (henceforth, DM) should
weakly prefer a given menu to any proper subset of it. This property appears
particularly appealing when the DM faces unforeseen contingencies and has
become a fairly common postulate in the menu choice literature.1 Yet,
there are many situations in life where an agent may strictly prefer smaller
menus to larger ones, for instance if he suffers from temptation a` la Gul and
Pesendorfer [19] or if he anticipates regret as in Sarver [30].2 Because they
typically focus on a single psychological phenomenon, most models of menu
choice allow for either preference for flexibility or commitment concerns, but
not both. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which both concerns
may coexist within a single framework, provided one imposes some discipline
on the way those concerns may emerge.
We propose that one circumstance under which the DM may prefer flex-
ibility over commitment is when he is unable to decide between two courses
of action. Indeed, a large experimental literature starting with Tversky and
Shafir [31] documents a higher tendency to defer choice when the available
alternatives have conflicting attributes. We study the behavioral implica-
tions of imposing the rule “Whenever in doubt, don’t commit; just leave
options open” in a standard menu choice environment. Our paper shows
that this intuitive rule, which ties preference for flexibility to indecisiveness,
may itself preclude the expression of any desire for commitment.
The idea of indecisiveness is of course not new in decision theory; it
dates back to Aumann [2], and is usually modeled directly by dropping the
assumption of completeness of the preference relation <ˆ that represents the
tastes of the DM.3 Although rarely studied in this context, the assumption
of incomplete preferences appears reasonable in the context of menu choice,
1See for instance Dekel et al. [10, 11] and more recently Krishna and Sadowski [22].
2Many other phenomena have been modeled through non-monotonic preferences over
menus; see Lipman and Pesendorfer [24] for a comprehensive review.
3Incomplete preferences have been studied in a variety of settings; see for instance,
Peleg [29], Dubra et al. [13], Bewley [3]) or Ok et al. [28].
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since the objects of comparison have a complex nature. At the same time,
we rarely observe the tastes of the DM; instead, what we see are the choices
he makes. Furthermore, assuming that the choice correspondence is non
empty, then its revealed preference < is necessarily complete.
We therefore take as our primitive a complete preference relation < on
X, which represents the choice behavior of the agent. We assume that the
choices of the DM reflect his tastes whenever those are defined, by requiring
that < be a proper completion of some underlying incomplete preference
<ˆ representing the DM’s tastes. We connect the DM’s indecisiveness to
his preference for flexibility by requiring that whenever two menus A and
B cannot be compared by <ˆ (denoted A .ˆ/ B), then one should observe
A∪B < A,B. Intuitively, an indecisive DM will often seek to defer choice if
he expects to be better informed in the future or if he needs additional time
to contemplate a difficult decision. Under such circumstances, choosing not
to commit to a given menu can be seen as a cautious attitude. We thus coin
this behavioral property Cautious Deferral and call a completion consistent
with it a Cautious Deferral completion.
Our main question is whether and when our complete preference < can
be interpreted as a Cautious Deferral completion of some underlying incom-
plete (but unobservable) preference <ˆ. We ask this question in the standard
framework of Dekel et al. [10, 11]; that is, we consider preference relations
defined on menus of lotteries that satisfy the usual rationality assumptions
of independence and continuity. Our answer highlights a strong connection
between indecisiveness, Cautious Deferral and preference for flexibility: pro-
vided <ˆ exhibits some incompleteness, then any completion < that satisfies
Cautious Deferral must exhibit preference for flexibility on its entire domain
(i.e. including all menus that can be ranked by <ˆ). Conversely, if < is a
Cautious Deferral completion that violates preference for flexibility at some
pair (A,B), then <ˆ must be complete. Thus, in the context of rational
preferences, our main proposition delivers an impossibility result: under the
restriction of Cautious Deferral, underlying incompleteness is incompatible
with any desire for commitment.
The present paper speaks to a recent literature that studies completion
and/or extension rules for incomplete preference relations in various con-
texts. For instance, Gilboa et al. [18], Kopylov [20] or Lehrer and Teper [23]
investigate such rules in the Anscombe-Aumann framework, while Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. [4] perform a similar exercise in a risky choice setting. We
note that most of these papers adopt a weaker notion of completion than
the one adopted in this paper, for they do not require the strict part of the
incomplete relation to be preserved by its completion.
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Our work also contributes to a literature that explores the connections
between incompleteness on the one hand, and preference for flexibility or
choice deferral on the other hand. Gerasimou [16] studies a model in which
indecisiveness induces choice deferral, as captured by a possibly empty-
valued choice correspondence. In menu choice environments, a one-to-one
link between incomparability and strict preference for flexibility appears in
various papers (Kreps [21], Arlegi and Nieto [1], Danan [7, 8]).4 This one-
to-one link is used by Danan [8] to uniquely derive incomplete preferences
from observed behavior. Unlike Danan [8], our main concern is not identifi-
cation of <ˆ, but existence of an incomplete <ˆ, in an environment with more
structure but with a weaker connecting condition.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
our framework and completion rule, present our main result and discuss the
degree of identification of <ˆ. Section 3 provides a brief discussion of the role
played by each of our assumptions. Additional results can be found in an
Online Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Preliminaries
We work in the standard menu choice framework of Dekel et al. [10, 11]
(henceforth DLR). Let ∆ stand for the set of all probability distributions
over a finite prize space Z, with generic members a, b. Let X be the set
of all nonempty closed subsets of ∆ endowed with the Hausdorff topology,
with generic members A,B. Members of X are interpreted as menus from
which the DM will make a choice at a later (unmodeled) stage. We refer to
λA+ (1− λ)B as the Minkowski mixture of two sets with weight λ ∈ (0, 1).
By a preference < over menus, we mean a reflexive and transitive binary
relation on X. As usual,  (resp. ∼) denotes the asymmetric (resp. sym-
metric) part of this relation. Define the non-comparability relation ./ on X
by A ./ B if and only if neither A < B nor B < A. If ./ = ∅, then < is
4Kreps [21] studies a complete preference relation < on X that satisfies monotonicity
(i.e. A ∪ B < A,B for all A,B ∈ X). Key to his analysis is an auxiliary domination
relation <ˆ defined as A <ˆ B if A ∼ A ∪ B. Notice that <ˆ is possibly incomplete and
that, given monotonicity, A .ˆ/ B if and only if A∪B  A,B. Furthermore, < is a proper
completion of <ˆ.
5We only require that incompleteness implies (weak) preference for flexibility (but not
conversely). On the other hand, we work in an environment of menus of lotteries with the
usual structural assumptions of independence and continuity, while Danan [8] considers a
generic environment without this additional structure.
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complete. We say that < is a proper completion of a preference relation <ˆ
if (i) < is complete; (ii) <ˆ ⊆ < and ˆ ⊆ . In the following, we say that <
has a (strict) preference for flexibility at a pair (A,B) if A∪B < () A,B.
If A∪B < A,B for all A,B ∈ X, then < is said to be monotone. Finally, the
DM has a desire for commitment at a pair (A,B) if A  A∪B or B  A∪B.
Throughout the paper, we will restrict attention to preferences that satisfy
the following two axioms:
Axiom 1 (Independence): For every A,B,C ∈ X and λ ∈ (0, 1)
A < B if and only if λA+ (1− λ)C < λB + (1− λ)C
Axiom 2 (Continuity): < is closed in X ×X.6
Both are natural extensions of the standard expected utility axioms to a
menu choice setting (see Dekel et al. [10, 11] or Gul and Pesendorfer [19] for
a discussion), and are canonical in most of the menu choice literature. In the
following, we refer to preferences satisfying A1 - A2 as rational preferences.
2.2 Cautious Deferral Completions
Our primitive is a complete and rational preference < on X, which, as in
the standard revealed preference approach, encodes the observed behavior
of the agent. We wish to understand when such behavior is consistent with
the choice deferral mechanism highlighted in the introduction, in which a
subjective conflict leads the agent to postpone. This motivates the following
definition:
Definition: A complete and rational preference < on X is a Cautious De-
ferral completion if there exists a rational preference <ˆ on X such that:
(C1 ) < is a proper completion of <ˆ.
(C2 ) A .ˆ/B implies A ∪B < A,B.
We interpret <ˆ as representing the comparisons the agent is confident about.
Whenever the DM can say that A is surely better than B, we expect him to
choose A over B (and choose either when indifferent), which is the content
6X ×X is viewed as the product metric space induced by the Hausdorff metric on X.
Note that continuity of <ˆ implies that .ˆ/ is open.
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of condition (C1 ). To understand (C2 ), note that an incomplete prefer-
ence <ˆ can always be viewed as the intersection of a collection of complete
preferences, each representing a different evaluation criterion in the mind of
the agent (See Ok [27], Section 1.4). Thus, the agent’s inability to compare
menus through <ˆ can be seen as stemming from the conflict between the
various considerations entering his evaluation of the problem.
When conflicted between two menus A and B, what rule of conduct may
the DM adopt? If the agent is constrained to choose from the feasible set
{A,B}, our representation imposes no constraint on what the final choice
will be. But now suppose that his choice set is actually {A,B,A∪B}. Both
introspection and empirical evidence suggest that the agent would seize this
additional opportunity, meaning A ∪ B < A,B, as this leaves all options
open at a later stage. A wide range of experimental studies in psychology
and economics indeed document a link between decision conflict and ten-
dency to differ choice (Tversky and Shafir [31], Dhar [12], Tykocinski and
Ruﬄe [32], Costa-Gomes et al. [6], Danan and Ziegelmeyer [9]). Intuitively,
an indecisive DM will often seek to defer choice if he expects to be better
informed in the future or if he needs additional time to contemplate a diffi-
cult decision. Under such circumstances, choosing not to commit to a given
menu can be seen as a cautious attitude. We thus coin (C2 ) the Cautious
Deferral rule.
2.3 Main Result
The purpose of our paper is to understand the restrictions on choice behav-
ior imposed by our cautious deferral mechanism. Our main result highlights
the connection between indecisiveness, Cautious Deferral and preference for
flexibility:
Proposition 1: Let < be a Cautious Deferral Completion on X. Then
either < is monotone, or <ˆ = <.
In words, provided <ˆ exhibits some incompleteness, then any completion
< that satisfies Cautious Deferral must exhibit preference for flexibility on
its entire domain. Conversely, if < is a Cautious Deferral completion that
violates set monotonicity, then <ˆ must be complete. As such, Proposition
1 delivers an impossibility result: in the context of rational preferences and
under the restriction of Cautious Deferral, underlying incompleteness is in-
compatible with any desire for commitment.
To illustrate this impossibility result, suppose we wanted to model the
behavior of an agent who suffers from temptation as in Gul and Pesendorfer
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[19], but abides by the Cautious Deferral rule whenever in doubt. Assume
that the DM’s behavior can be seen as the Cautious Deferral completion <
of some incomplete relation <ˆ capturing the core preferences of the agent. It
is reasonable to assume that a DM who may be tempted will favor commit-
ment whenever he can clearly identify elements of temptation (i.e. A <ˆ B,
and hence A < B, implies A < A ∪B), but will prefer not to commit when
he is indecisive (i.e. A .ˆ/ B implies A ∪ B < A). Yet, this intuition runs
to a difficulty in the presence of the standard rationality axioms. For, take
any two menus A and B for which the DM can express a preference, say
A <ˆ B. By our logic, it must be that A < A ∪ B. However, if < is also a
Cautious Deferral completion of <ˆ, then Proposition 1 tells us that < must
be monotone, so that A ∪ B < A. Therefore, A ∼ A ∪ B, implying that
self-control motives must entirely disappear.
Proof of Proposition 1:7 Suppose that < is a Cautious Deferral Com-
pletion of some underlying incomplete preference <ˆ (i.e. with .ˆ/ 6= ∅), but
< is not monotone. Then there are menus A,B,C,D such that A .ˆ/ B,
C ⊂ D, and C  D. We show that Cautious Deferral must be violated.
Since <ˆ and < satisfy continuity and independence, we can assume w.l.o.g.
that A,B,C and D are closed convex sets and that A  B. In fact Indepen-
dence implies that A ∼ co(A) where co(A) is the convex hull of A. Moreover,
since C  D if A ∼ B then A′ = αA + (1 − α)C  αB + (1 − α)D = B′
for any α ∈ (0, 1). As continuity implies incomparability is open, for α close
enough to 1 we must have A ./ B. If B < A ∪ B, then A  A ∪ B and,
hence, Cautious Deferral is violated. So assume A ∪B  B. Let
E =
1
2
C +
1
2
A
F =
1
2
C +
1
2
B
G =
1
2
D +
1
2
B
H =
1
2
C +
1
2
co(A ∪B).
Then H  F  G and, hence, F ∼ I = αG+ (1− α)H for some α ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, F is contained in I. Since < is a proper completion of <ˆ, either
F ∼ˆ I or F .ˆ/ I. If F .ˆ/ I, then F  J = βG+ (1−β)I .ˆ/ F and F ⊂ J for
any β ∈ (0, 1), since the closed convex subsets of Rn form a mixture space
7We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for offering this shorter proof.
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under +. Thus Cautious Deferral is violated. So assume F ∼ˆ I. We have
E .ˆ/ F and, hence, K = γE + (1− γ)F .ˆ/ F and K ⊂ I for any γ ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, E  F and, hence, K  F . It follows that K .ˆ/ I and K  I, so
Cautious Deferral is violated 
2.4 Identification of <ˆ
Our Cautious Deferral rule draws a fairly weak link between indecisiveness
and choice deferral. First, the rule does not require the DM to strictly prefer
to postpone when unable to compare two menus, as it allows A .ˆ/ B and
A ∪ B ∼ A. Second, one can have pairs (A,B) at which < exhibits strict
preference for flexibility even though A <ˆB. Hence conflict in the underly-
ing preference <ˆ neither forcibly causes, nor exhausts all justifications for,
postponement.
One natural question concerns what can be learned under our Cautious
Deferral mechanism about the underlying relation <ˆ that represents the
tastes of the DM. Here we show by an example that not only one cannot
hope to infer <ˆ uniquely but, in fact, <ˆ need not even be monotone.
Example: Consider the real maps W1 and W2 on X defined by
W1(A) := max
a∈A
w(a)− 1
2
max
a∈A
v(a)
and
W2(A) := max
a∈A
v(a)− 1
2
max
a∈A
w(a),
where w and v are continuous and affine functions on4 such that w 6= αv+β
for any α > 0 and β ∈ R. Then, the relation <ˆ defined as
A <ˆB if and only if W1(A) >W1(B) and W2(A) >W2(B),
is incomplete and satisfies Axioms 1 - 2. On the other hand, the preference
relation < on X represented by W1 +W2 is a monotone proper completion
of <. Hence, < satisfies the cautious deferral rule, but <ˆ is not monotone.
Finally, it should be noted that the complete preference < in the above
example is also the proper completion of <˙ given by A <˙B if and only
if maxa∈Aw(a) ≥ maxb∈B w(b) and maxa∈A v(a) ≥ maxb∈B v(b). This re-
mark points to the weak identification of the underlying relation <ˆ in our
environment. In fact, it is impossible to uniquely identify an underlying
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relation under our Cautious Deferral mechanism: since any monotone com-
pletion trivially satisfies the Cautious Deferral rule, a given monotone and
complete preference < satisfying independence and continuity can be the
Cautious Deferral completion of any subrelation <˙ of < that is proper (in
the sense that ˙ ⊆ ) and satisfies independence and continuity.8
3 Discussion
Since it is natural to expect agents to favor either flexibility or commitment
depending on the situation, our result puts into question either the validity
of the Cautious Deferral rule as a general rule of conduct, or the rationality
assumptions commonly made in the menu choice literature, continuity and
independence. We discuss each assumption below.
3.1 Cautious Deferral versus Cautious Avoidance
One could argue that the flip side of Cautious Deferral, requiring that A .ˆ/ B
implies A,B < A ∪B, might be a more appropriate assumption in the con-
text of temptation. Indeed, if the DM is indecisive between two menus
because of the respective temptations they contain, then committing to ei-
ther menu would seem to be a more cautious attitude than leaving options
open: by avoiding exposure to one of the temptations, the agent can in-
crease his chances of exerting self-control.9 We therefore coin this condition
Cautious Avoidance. Given the structure of our proof, it is easy to see that
a symmetric result would be obtained if Cautious Deferral were to be re-
placed by Cautious Avoidance, this time with the conclusion that nonempty
incomparability implies “negative” monotonicity (A < B whenever A ⊆ B).
8A tighter identification of <ˆ could be obtained by strengthening our connecting con-
dition to A .ˆ/ B if and only if A ∪ B  A,B. In this case, one can show that <ˆ can be
uniquely identified, which echoes the result of Danan [8]. See Online Appendix for more
details.
9For instance, consider a DM who faces 3 options: broccoli b, potato chips p and
chocolate cake c. Options p and c are more tempting than b, p as a salty craving and
c as a sweet craving, while b is healthier than both p and c. Suppose the DM cannot
determine which craving is stronger, so that {b, p} .ˆ/ {b, c}. In this case, one would expect
the DM to choose either {b, p} or {b, c} over {b, c, p}, since the latter set guarantees the
worst temptation. We thank John Stovall for providing this example.
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3.2 Independence
The linearity imposed by the independence axiom plays an essential role
in the proof of our main result, for it allows the consequences of the local
interaction between indecisiveness and Cautious Deferral to spread globally.
In the Online Appendix, we consider the natural relaxation of independence
to Indifference to Randomization, which requires that A ∼ co(A) for all
A ∈ X. We show that this relaxation, which breaks the linearity behind
independence while preserving the convexity, allows Cautious Deferral to
coexist with the non monotonicity of <. As such, our main result is another
illustration of the technical power of the independence axiom.
While often considered a technical assumption, the independence axiom
is particularly strong in environments of menu choice, for it relies on two
premises: (i) the DM satisfies the standard independence axiom; (ii) he is
indifferent as to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. The second
premise has been challenged in various papers for it precludes many inter-
esting behavioral phenomena (Epstein et al. [14], Ergin and Sarver [15],
Noor and Takeoka [26]). In this paper, we find that independence leaves no
room for commitment concerns once Cautious Deferral is imposed.
3.3 Other structural assumptions
From the above discussion, one might be inclined to believe that our impos-
sibility result is essentially driven by the independence axiom. However, the
other ingredients of the model are necessary for the result to go through.
First, the closed continuity of <ˆ (implying .ˆ/ is open) ensures that incom-
parability, when present, will never be too “small”: for any A,B ∈ X such
that A .ˆ/ B, there will be two open neighbourhoods OA of A and OB of B
such that C .ˆ/ D for C ∈ OA and D ∈ OB. In the Online Appendix, we
show that closed continuity cannot be replaced by the most common alter-
native for incomplete relations, open continuity. Finally, we show that our
requirement that < be a proper completion is not innocuous, as it cannot
be weakened to only requiring that A <ˆ B implies A < B.
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